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THE TERROR TRAP

Kenneth E. Roberts

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27 August 1975

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
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proportionately with their perceived accommodations with Soviet national interests, despite a policy of reducing international tensions with the West through detente. Both superpowers must recognize that the techniques of terrorism can be used by anyone regardless of ideology or nationality, that mutually beneficial decision alone will not solve the problem, but is a prerequisite to reversing current trends of escalating terrorism and to achieving world peace, security, and genuine detente. Otherwise, US and Soviet power and competition, creative, or otherwise, may become meaningless in an international system whose rules, structure, and order will be vastly different.

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THE TERROR TRAP

by

Kenneth E. Roberts

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
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FOREWORD

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DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USA
Commandant

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MR. KENNETH E. ROBERTS joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1973. Prior to his present position, he was an analyst in the Office of the Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army. He has a degree in international relations from the American University and a masters degree in international affairs from Florida State University. Mr. Roberts has contributed to published compendiums dealing with national security.

THE TERROR TRAP

The British Prime Minister received a letter from the Special Executive for Counterintelligence, Terrorism, Revenge, and Extortion (S.P.E.C.T.R.E.) after an aircraft carrying two atomic weapons had been hijacked. The letter demanded £100,000,000 in gold bullion for return of the two atomic weapons and threatened the destruction of a major city in an undesignated country. A copy was furnished to the President of the United States. All the intelligence services realized that nuclear secrets had become well-known - only the prototypes were really difficult. This was the world's first blackmail case, and there was nothing to do but pay up if the terrorists couldn't be stopped.¹

Over 15 years have passed since Ian Fleming's novel, *Thunderball*, was published, but today that fictitious plot is now being taken seriously throughout the US Government and in academic communities. Bombings, kidnappings, and airplane hijackings have become routine, but nuclear, chemical, and biological blackmail promise more suspense in the near future. Terrorist acts are widely reported today to audiences eager for the drama and excitement such stories produce. Millions of US television viewers now get a weekly dose of terrorism in the new series, S.W.A.T.

Surprisingly little serious writing has been done on this subject.

however, despite the great impact of its effects. This essay will first attempt to define terrorism and to create a greater understanding of its complexity and seriousness. Official US action both at the national and international level to prevent its spread will be analyzed. Finally, the phenomenon will be put into the context of US-Soviet relations, currently expressed in terms of the popular notion of *detente*.

Many people still argue that the terrorist threat is greatly exaggerated and largely irrelevant to national security considerations and international relations. They point out that in the past five or six years there have been fewer people killed in terrorist incidents than in traffic accidents over any major holiday weekend. These people argue that the physical damage, including ransom, has been less than the annual loss due to shoplifting in the United States, and that there are probably fewer than 1,000 real Arab terrorists.²

Such arguments reflect a superficial understanding of the problem's dimensions. Recently the hands of the "doomsday clock," which appears on the front cover of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* to symbolize the threat of nuclear doom, moved three minutes closer to midnight. The editors of this magazine, founded at the end of World War II by the designers of the first atomic bomb, listed one reason for changing the time to nine minutes before the hour as the failure of governments generally to face the ugly fact that the rapid development of nuclear energy is making society increasingly vulnerable to "the disruptive acts of desperate individuals and organizations."³

One government scientist in a 1950 British film stole an atomic bomb and threatened to blow up London unless all such weapons were outlawed. A variety of other less violent strategies for fighting terrorism have been suggested since then, but many factors make the job increasingly complex. Terrorism is in conflict with the values and traditions of most modern Western states, but to much of the world it is related directly to their historical experience, ideology, environment, and interests. Today, even in the West, the social contract of shared values, beliefs, and rules is being challenged.

Terrorism is an essentially urban, socially or legally unacceptable, violent alternative or reaction to *de facto* political, economic, and military power, whether or not that power can be described as legitimate. It uses fear, surprise, violence, or the threat of violence to achieve some personal, social, or political goal. It involves coercion and the illegal or immoral use of force, and may be a tactic of criminal action, internal warfare, transnational violence, or international conflict.⁴

A somewhat broader definition of terrorism than that usually accepted leads to identification of seven types of actors. Although these categories are by no means absolute, they each challenge the social contract by employing force and fear rather than debate and reason. The categories include:

- political terrorists, insurgents, or multinational guerrillas who seek to seize power, establish their legitimacy, or disrupt an existing government for particular social/ideological goals;
- anarchists, who seek simply to disrupt the functions of government or society;
- criminal terrorists, or bandits, who engage in illegal activities for profit, employing terror when necessary;
- insane terrorists, who engage in acts of terrorism as the result of a serious personal, psychological disorder;
- counterterror terrorists, or establishment terrorists, who as members of the governing elite use terror tactics to secure their bases of power and manage the society;
- tuxedo terrorists, or coercive diplomats, who practice nuclear proliferation and brinksmanship by manipulating the world balance of terror to ensure the survival or supremacy of their nations, or who authorize terrorist military acts on sovereign states or on individual citizens of other nations;
- "Middle American" terrorists, such as striking truckers or coal miners, who reject peaceful strikes and use violence to express their rage and dramatize their demands. This group may include many who have never suffered economically but suddenly find themselves unemployed urban welfare clients in a period of recession, inflation, and excess profits.

Terrorism is economical in terms of time, effort, and resources. Terrorist acts do not require large armies, extensive training, logistical support, or sophisticated arsenal. Organization, secrecy, discipline, and conviction are all much more important. The tremendous destructiveness and cost of modern weaponry is rapidly making traditional warfare impractical. Some nations, groups, and individuals are therefore adopting terrorism, the new "unconventional warfare," as an alternate means for opposing seemingly invincible adversaries.

Terror as a tactic is not new. It was employed during the US Civil War, during the French, Russian, and Irish revolutions, and by resistance movements during the Second World War. Since then, there have been many cases of internal terrorist violence. Algeria, Vietnam,

Quebec, Latin America, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland. It became particularly widespread during the sixties, but became truly transnational only with the most recent campaign by Palestinian guerrillas.

The interaction of violent personalities, vast publics, and visual media has had a profound effect on recent political events. Urbanization, industrialization, and technology have greatly increased the interdependence and vulnerability of society and the fragility of the modern city. Instant communications and widespread sophisticated weaponry allow as few as one or two determined individuals to disrupt some vital aspect of society and turn a local event into a worldwide drama. The dangers of terrorism will be particularly acute during the US Bicentennial celebrations.

Many terrorist acts, particularly kidnappings and commercial airliner hijackings, appear irrational since often the target is not the real enemy and may not even oppose the terrorists' aims. The victims may, however, possess significant indirect influence and leverage by serving as symbols of opposed institutions or simply targets on whom an attack would assure theater and publicity. Innocent victims are actually better bargaining pawns since they usually evoke greater sympathy from the public.

Terrorist movements likely to be most violent are those based upon sociopolitical frustration and ideological conviction. They may come from either the left or the right. While profiles of the typical terrorist have been made, he may be of any age, sex, race, background, or culture. He may belong to a well-trained and financed rebel army or he may be acting alone. In most cases, he seeks to advertise and dramatize a wider discontent through an act of violence. "Political frustration," "despair," and "loss" are all terms that have been associated with the revolutionary terrorist, for whom abstract concepts become tangible goals which make the world much more meaningful and understandable. Often the terrorist act itself serves as a substitute for a revolution which is really impractical.

THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

About one-third of the nations of the world may have programs for the production of nuclear energy, and thus the potential for making nuclear weapons, by the end of the decade. The production of plutonium, a by-product of nuclear power reactors, will therefore

expand at a tremendous rate. Experts predict private companies will soon own more plutonium than currently exists in all North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) weapons. These predictions are based on the development of the "breeder reactor" which generates more plutonium than it consumes.⁵

Several years ago, U-235 was advertised for sale in England. Although the whole thing was a hoax, it did prove that there were plenty of interested buyers.⁶ A country with a nuclear capability, if under a general economic strain from a shortage of oil, might be tempted to barter atomic weapons for oil.⁷ It is a frightening possibility that should not be ignored no matter how remote. For the first time several nations now possess incredible sums of cash which certainly must tempt international criminal elements to deliver whatever these nations want. Plutonium is today valued at a price higher than either gold or heroin. With the proliferation of nuclear materials and mentalities, a large number of US nuclear specialists have become convinced that criminal and terrorist groups will have access to stolen nuclear materials and will have the capabilities to fashion them into some sort of crude nuclear device with at least some chance of giving near the same destructive force as the Hiroshima explosion. Many safeguard experts are already focusing on ways to prevent or at least minimize the damage from a clandestinely-produced atomic bomb.⁸

Much of the current thinking and concern about the possibilities of atomic blackmail can be traced to work of Theodore B. Taylor, one of America's foremost nuclear physicists. His concerns were popularized in an extraordinary series of articles by John McPhee in the *New Yorker* (December 3, 10, and 17, 1973 issues). He warns that, although opinion is divided, some experienced physicists believe that one person, working alone with material stolen from private industry, could fabricate an atomic bomb.⁹ Taylor is convinced that a homemade bomb is possible, and that the people with ability to make it are already in the tens of thousands and expanding. Much of the information needed to design such a weapon can either be found in a good encyclopedia or bought from the Government Printing Office.¹⁰ One statistic often quoted is that between one and two million men in the United States have already been trained in the handling, moving, and operation of nuclear weapons. Diversion and theft scenarios have been published by experts in nuclear technology. Each year, according to information provided to Congress, 3 percent of the approximately 120,000 military men and civilians who work with US nuclear weapons are discovered to be

security risks, a total of 3,647 in one recent year. These employees are removed from their jobs primarily because of drug abuse, mental illness, alcoholism, or discipline problems. Within NATO, from 1971 to mid-1973, 1,247 nuclear specialists were fired or transferred under a program designed to identify those possibly subject to blackmail or irrational behavior.¹¹

According to a recent *New York Times* article, an unnamed Federal official states that already there have been two known incidents in which government employees were discovered to have smuggled enough special nuclear materials out of guarded facilities to make a nuclear weapon. Exactly how much plutonium and high-enriched uranium is unaccounted for is highly classified, but one Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) official was quoted as saying one plant could not account for 9,000 pounds of uranium, and that controls were so bad at another plant that the total "Materials Unaccounted For" (MUF) was impossible to estimate. Another scientist stated that cumulative MUF from the government's gaseous diffusion plants is measured in tons.¹² Although such figures seem exaggerated, a number of Government Accounting Office studies have confirmed deficiencies and have reported unarmed watchmen, unlocked outside doors, lack of intrusion alarms, and other security hazards. While investigations have thus far indicated that no significant amount of nuclear material has in fact been stolen, it is generally acknowledged that these conditions represent a potential problem area. The chances for a bomb being stolen are much less than those for theft of materials used to make a bomb. The US armed forces go to extraordinary lengths to prevent loss of an atomic weapons. General Michael S. Davison, former Commander of US Army Forces in Europe, argues that Army Special Forces units have attempted to penetrate atomic weapons storage sites but have always failed. He stated the nuclear weapons were, at present, "relatively secure," and noted a provision to destroy the warheads with conventional explosives if a storage site is overrun. Nevertheless, he admits "it would be difficult to protect any target which was the object of a well-trained and properly armed and maniacal group." Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger has commented that there is only a low risk of penetration by any terrorist group. Representative Clarence D. Long, however, who recently conducted his own six-month investigation argues that, despite certain improvements, there are "serious security deficiencies at many weapons sites in the United States, Europe, and Asia." Many of these deficiencies are locational and cannot be eliminated entirely by improved security measures.¹³

If they didn't know it before, terrorists are now aware of the nuclear options available to them. Recently, many major magazines and newspapers around the world have headlined articles warning of the danger and stressing the ease of atomic blackmail. Such articles have done much to alert the general public to the threat and have acted as a catalyst for governmental action, but they have also greatly increased the number of prank threats with which the authorities must deal. The new awareness necessitates that all such threats be taken seriously. Several nuclear blackmail threats in California, in fact, have prompted the state Office of Emergency Services to send a warning note to local law enforcement officials which advised them of a 24-hour AEC emergency telephone number they should use when such blackmail threats are received.¹⁴

Although the experts say that nuclear materials and skills are certainly within the scope of a terrorist's arsenal, biological and chemical agents are much less complex and are more readily available. Biological sabotage has never been tried, and thus no one really knows what the consequences may be. Various "plots" have already been reported, however, including one in 1970 which supposedly involved a plan by a group of revolutionaries to blackmail a homosexual lieutenant at Fort Detrick, Maryland, into giving them enough bacteriological material "to incapacitate a population by infection for 7 to 10 days." The Customs Bureau was warned that the materials were to be used to poison a city's water supply.¹⁵

Although recent treaties and congressional actions to limit biological and chemical weapons production have reduced dangers somewhat, the fact remains that numerous chemical and pharmaceutical companies have the materials to accomplish a terrifying, credible blackmail plot. Some of these compounds are even advertised for sale in trade publications. According to recent reports, the British Department of Defense has declassified the formulas of a list of lethal nerve gases developed in the 1950's and the information is now readily available in the London Public Patents Office.¹⁶

A DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACH

The US response to terrorism's threat to the international system and to state sovereignty involves a combination of measures for deterrence and protection. Former Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Combating Terrorism Lewis Hoffacker stated

that terrorism must be made "unprofitable."¹⁷ Officially, the United States refuses to pay any ransom or to release any prisoners, even in cases where hostages are involved. A strategy of supporting bilateral agreements and multilateral conventions to suppress terrorism has been combined with a policy of seeking support for instituting sanctions against states which harbor terrorists, and occasional unilateral responses involving diplomatic action.

On September 25, 1972, President Nixon established the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism to consider means to deter terrorism both in the United States and abroad, to establish government procedures, and to work with other governments and intelligence organizations. The Committee is chaired by the Secretary of State and composed of a number of Cabinet level and other high officials, including the Secretary of Defense. It is supported by a working group comprised of designated senior representatives of the committee members. Federal officers, departments, and agencies are to cooperate fully with the Committee in carrying out its functions, and comply fully with whatever policies, guidelines, standards, and procedures it prescribes.

The Cabinet Committee itself has met only three times, but the working group of the Cabinet Committee meets every two weeks to exchange information and to discuss topics of mutual interest. When a crisis occurs, the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Combating Terrorism immediately brings together an ad hoc task force from interested agencies, which may or may not include individual members of the working group. Communications are set up with the country concerned and a set of standard operating procedures based on previous incidents is set into motion. Particularly tough decisions might be referred to the President.¹⁸ After the crisis, the working group gets together to recount "lessons learned."

Although the Committee should be a policy planning body dealing primarily with preventative measures, it is primarily geared for response to emergencies. The group has, however, made much progress in coordinating government antiterrorist activity and in avoiding duplication. Individual departments continue to manage their own programs dealing with terrorism, but now with greater coordination. The Cabinet Committee aids many potentially serious jurisdictional disputes as each agency seeks to protect its own organizational interest by becoming actively involved in decisionmaking. Despite the success thus far, the Committee needs to gain wider recognition and visibility.¹⁹

The United States should also continue to work within the framework of international organizations, particularly the United Nations (UN), to seek some compromise or suppression of terrorism. National liberation movements cannot be realistically ignored and some acts of terrorism will inevitably occur during such wars, as in fact they do during all wars. Third party states which harbor and support terrorists, however, should be effectively quarantined by the world community of nations, including loss of UN representation and subjection to economic and civil aviation boycotts. The United States sponsored a UN action in 1972 to prohibit the export of violence to innocent persons, but the international body was unable to agree on justifiable versus illegal violence. The only UN measure taken thus far was approved in December 1973 and requires the extradition or prosecution of persons who kidnap diplomats or officials of foreign governments.

Other important legal precedents and a framework for international action against terrorism do exist. These include the 1929 Geneva Convention on Counterfeiting, Interpol, the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, a convention for the creation of an international criminal court, and a 1971 Organization of American States Convention on the protection of diplomats. UN Resolution 2625 (XXV) implies that wars of self-determination are an exception, but several previous General Assembly resolutions have reaffirmed the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, prepared by the International Law Commission in 1954, which notes the illegality of supporting international terrorist activities.

Although the UN has acted regarding "diplomatic agents and other internationally protected persons," an ad hoc committee on terrorism established after the 1972 debates has been unable to compromise conflicting views. No new US proposal or pressure is likely to change that. Most Western states support a strong convention to prevent and punish terrorism, regardless of motive. African, Arab, and Eastern bloc states, on the other hand, are more concerned with the underlying causes of terrorism and refuse to support any agreement which fails to condemn state terror by "colonial, racist, and alien regimes," or which may restrict national liberation movements. Again in December 1974, the General Assembly's Legal Committee recommended that proposals for UN action against international terrorism be delayed another year. In addition to the traditional opponents, even some Western European nations are apparently reluctant to debate terrorism at this time.²⁰

THE NEED FOR JOINT US-SOVIET ACTION

US-Soviet cooperation to suppress international terrorism would not eliminate the problem entirely, but a united effort would certainly help deter its practice, legitimacy, and escalation. The problem, however, lies at the root of the UN debate—whether or not terrorism includes violent acts committed by “oppressed peoples” in the name of national liberation.

The Soviet Union did support the UN action that defined diplomats as “internationally protected persons” and called for prosecution and extradition of those who commit terrorist acts against them. Support also has been given to the drafting of an antiterrorism convention by the UN International Law Commission and to conventions to suppress airplane hijacking. Many of the more spectacular terrorist acts, such as the Munich and Lod massacres, have drawn strong criticism in the official press, and Soviet UN representatives have reiterated the need to stop individual terrorists before their destructive power gets greater. In 1972, a Soviet Foreign Ministry Legal expert, Dmitri N. Kolesnik, took issue with the Saudi UN delegate who compared some terrorists to Robin Hood. “Robin Hood,” Kolesnik noted, “was armed with bows and arrows, but modern terrorists prefer to have rifles and bombs and tomorrow it’s quite possible they will have death-carrying germs or maybe stolen atomic bombs. And with the help of these bombs, they can blackmail any government.”²¹

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union still interprets, supports, or opposes the methods, activities, and purposes of various terrorist groups proportionately to their accommodation with perceived Soviet national interests. Moscow thus pursues a policy of reducing international tensions through detente with the West, while, at the same time, implicitly condoning selected acts of international terrorism. Soviet support for liberation movements is, of course, dependent on the ideological persuasion of those struggling and the particular authority struggled against. Occasionally the activities of a politically congenial terrorist group are criticized, but such criticism is usually directed toward the counterproductive results of particular tactics rather than the immorality or illegality of the act itself.

The Soviet Union generally brands those who commit “unacceptable” acts of terror as either fascists, anarchists, or Maoists. One Russian observer, speaking of the worldwide class struggle, writes in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*,

... it is perfectly obvious that no resolution is possible without violence. But this should be revolutionary violence directed against the exploiter minority and carried out with the participation of the broadest masses of the working people and in the name of these masses. Otherwise, whatever technical facilities the terrorists have at their disposal (they are even considering a portable atomic bomb, the French magazine *Paris MATCH* recently wrote), their actions will inevitably be yet another in the already numerous explosions which have changed nothing.²²

This same article charges that bourgeois forces, under the pretext of combating leftist revolutionary groups, "take measures to strengthen the repressive apparatus and hunt down all democratic and progressive forces. Many acts of sabotage are now initially hatched in police stations and only subsequently in leftist groups." An example given is the organizer of a plan several years ago to blow up the Statue of Liberty who was allegedly a paid agent who bought the dynamite with police funds.²³ "Today," notes another Soviet commentator, "it is primarily the reactionary forces themselves which resort to terror."²⁴

The terrorist is considered heretical for most orthodox socialists who have a system to be defended on a nation-by-nation basis. Although the Soviet Union has supported the Fedayeen, the IRA, and various other "liberation movements," it has shown relatively little sympathy for their more dramatic "terrorist" activities. In fact, USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko publicly assailed terrorist acts in a September 26, 1972 UN speech, singling out certain Palestinian guerrillas specifically. The Soviet Union has been very critical of some leftist revolutionary groups such as the Baader-Meinhoff group in West Germany, the Red Army Organization of Japan, and the Red Brigades in Italy, where their actions worked at cross purposes to the Soviet policy of attempting to further the notion of Communist legitimacy. Marxists, in theory at least, accept the necessity for class violence, but oppose unauthorized, individual terrorist acts- "the propaganda of the deed."

Although there is some suspicion that the Soviet Union may have heavily supported groups engaged in terrorist activities in the United States, there is little evidence. Communist sponsorship of domestic US terrorism cannot be ruled out completely, but a policy of such subversion from Moscow or Peking is unlikely. The disadvantages of such sponsorship would far outweigh the advantages since international tensions would be created which might escalate dangerously. Laundering of association to avoid overt identification with US terrorist groups would be required to such a degree that no effective control

could be ensured over their activities. Perhaps most importantly, the Soviet Union does not need to encourage terrorist groups; they have shown sufficient initiative on their own.

Most US terrorists have apparently had little affection for the "system," in which the Soviet Union has an important vested interest. Mr. Patrick J. Mullany, representing the FBI in recent congressional hearings on terrorism, stated that:

The odds are that he [the terrorist] will not follow Marxist-Leninist-type philosophy to a T. If you listen to his rhetoric, you might be able to take Marxist-Leninist-Maoist philosophies and pick out areas that he will cling on to, and he will take them into his rhetoric. As for him showing a strong allegiance to Marxist-Leninist-Maoist type of philosophy, the possibility is probably very remote.²⁵

Since Marxism-Leninism ideologically rejects individual terror as a method of revolutionary action which diverts workers' attention away from the mass struggle, a strong foundation for US-Soviet cooperation in combating international terrorism would appear to exist. Perceived national interests have predominated over ideological rhetoric for the Soviet Union, however, and Moscow has often been eager to exploit acts of individual terror. Two contemporary crises offer convincing evidence for this conclusion—Ulster and the Middle East.

Relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union have been strained in recent years. This has been due in part to Moscow's sympathy and alleged material support for Irish Republican Army (IRA) guerrillas in Ulster. Moscow's official line has been that Protestant extremists and British troops are responsible for the reign of violence and terror in Northern Ireland. When IRA bombs have made indisputable headlines, the Soviet reaction has been to criticize the tactics of the Provisional Wing of the IRA, not because 20 innocent people were killed, but because those actions have led the Labor government to pass "draconian" laws to combat terror which permit the police to detain and jail anyone who simply seems suspicious.

In addition, Moscow claims that the British government provokes the more irresponsible elements in Northern Ireland for its own interests. Radio Moscow condemned the June 1974 IRA bombing of Parliament as "providing the authorities with a pretext for stepping up their repressive measures,"²⁶ and in a broadcast in English to Great Britain and Ireland, a commentary suggested the bombing might have been carried out by British intelligence as "a monstrous provocation having nothing in common with the terrorists from the IRA."²⁷

The Soviet Union claims it "has never supported the IRA, neither with arms nor morally," but there is great suspicion in Britain and some evidence to the contrary.²⁸ On various occasions, IRA members have used Soviet-made weapons, including rifles, submachine guns, and rockets, although these weapons probably were transported through some third country such as Libya. Moscow has denied all such allegations, but has refused to help trace the origin of Soviet-made rocket launchers being used by the IRA.

The Soviets have charged that stories of USSR involvement in Ulster are part of a Tory trick to harm detente and create a "crude propaganda hullabaloo" to "divert British public attention from the true cause of the Ulster crisis."²⁹ One report claims that:

Britain is today the only country in Europe that has established the rule of violence and terror on its own territories . . . It is only natural, therefore, to ask whether the latest anti-Soviet campaign supported at government level has not the purpose of diverting British and world attention from this undemocratic act. But then diverting attention from the real causes of the Ulster crisis is only one of the motives behind the present anti-Soviet hysteria worked up by British propaganda. *The Times*, going all-out in its anti-Soviet speculation, links Northern Ireland with the talks at Helsinki, which have the purpose of preparing a European Conference on Security and Cooperation. By so doing, *The Times* unwittingly or unwittingly throws light on another objective of its anti-Soviet campaign. This is to poison the atmosphere for next year's European conference.³⁰

The USSR has charged that Britain has used the crisis in Northern Ireland to further collaboration between the military troops and the policy "aimed at preparing them for suppressing working class demonstrations." TASS charged, in one instance, that "troops equipped with tanks and machine guns are still guarding London's main airport at Heathrow long after stories that the authorities were taking precautions to deter 'political terrorists' have been proved false."³¹ Several Soviet dispatches have predicted that such military exercises are merely rehearsals for a right wing military coup.³²

Thus, the Soviet Union has not overtly supported the terrorist tactics of the IRA, but has shown strong sympathy for the movement itself. There is some evidence of material support for the organization, but it has apparently not been substantial. Detente, however, has not persuaded either the Soviet Union or Britain to abandon cold war rhetoric. The Soviet Union, in particular, is guilty of exploiting Ulster terrorism for its own purposes of embarrassing and weakening the

British government and NATO. Moscow has even managed to bring the United States into the controversy by charging:

American officers who took part in the aggression against the peoples of South Vietnam are helping the organization of armed Protestant terrorists called the Ulster Defense Association. As a spokesman of the association stated openly in Belfast today, so-called American specialists are now in the Ulster capital and are training the Protestant recruits in how to handle weapons and methods in the struggle against the civil rights fighters. As has now become apparent, the American military now includes in its lectures the preservation of tension in Ulster.³³

The Soviet Union also strongly criticized Greek terrorism in Cyprus where Moscow's reactions again did not seem to be influenced by the popular definitions of detente. Rather, they merely sought to drive another wedge into the NATO southern flank. In one dispatch before the 1974 crisis, Moscow charged that:

the Cypriots know well who backs the terrorists. Behind the terrorists are the aggressive NATO forces and reactionary officers, placemen of the Athens military junta, who have not abandoned plans of turning independent Cyprus, which consistently conducts the policy of neutrality, into NATO's unshakable aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean.³⁴

The Soviet position vehemently criticizes Israeli state terrorism and accuses Israel of exploiting Arab terrorist acts by using them as excuses to perpetrate new terrorist acts against neighboring Arab countries and Palestinian refugee camps there, as well as against inhabitants of the occupied territories. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has shown increasing support for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and has served as an apologist for terrorist acts committed by its more radical members. A clear distinction is made between the PLO leadership and more radical groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and PLO denials of terrorist acts are always given wide dissemination by the Soviet media.

Even when members of the PLO are clearly guilty, the Soviet Union responds by accusing the culprits of working for Israeli intelligence, and also probably indirectly the Central Intelligence Agency, to divert world public attention from some Israeli aggressive actions or discredit the cause of the Palestinians. After one recent hijacking of a Japan Airlines plane, the Soviet people were informed that "Maoist adventurers, whose actions were probably controlled, as has happened

before, by Zionist agents in Europe, have again acted in the interests of Israel and to the detriment of the Arab people's struggle against Israeli aggression."³⁵

The USSR makes it very clear that the majority of PLO actions are in pursuit of national liberation and therefore justifiable.

... The Soviet Union proceeding from positions of principle, opposes any attempts to use the question of international terrorism perpetrated by individual elements in order to harm this struggle, whose justness and legitimacy has been recognized, in particular, by the United Nations in its official decisions. Such a differentiation is necessary primarily because the imperialist and colonial regimes have tried and continue to try to accuse the leaders and active members of national liberation movements of terrorism and banditry, and because they want to justify suppressing these movements on the pretext of combating international terrorism.³⁶

The Soviet Union would like to play a more visible role in Middle East peace negotiations. Gromyko has urged Arab unity to avoid facing the decisions of which countries to back if they adopted different policies during the negotiations. He has thrown his weight behind Yassir Arafat, and has tried to create a situation in which no genuine peace can be achieved without PLO participation.

Israeli observers claim evidence that the ultimate reason for the USSR's overwhelming support for the PLO is to gain control over an eventually separate, strategically-located Palestinian state. Many of the arms and sophisticated weapons which the Soviet Union has supplied to Arab governments, particularly Syria, have found their way into PLO hands, and there are indications of even more direct support. One report quotes Israeli sources as stating that "Russia is training militant Palestinians for a Moscow-oriented political and military takeover when a Palestinian state emerges," and that "captured propaganda material and interrogations revealed that small groups of Palestinian guerrillas had been trained politically and militarily in Russia in the past few months, and that more were being 'processed'."³⁷ Whether or not these fears are justifiable, Soviet support for Palestinian guerrilla organizations does undoubtedly reflect the goal of exerting greater influence on the Arab oil-producing countries in the Middle East and increasing Moscow's stature as a world power.

As terrorist incidents become more spectacular and widespread, increased support can be expected for measures against international terrorism from previously reluctant nations. After the January 1975

attacks at Orly Airport by Arab terrorists, for instance, the French Minister of the Interior, Michel Poniatowski, became the first French official to advocate international efforts to establish a code for the punishment of terrorists.³⁸ France had unsuccessfully calculated that her support for the Arabs would prevent susceptibility to Palestinian terrorism. Likewise, although the Soviet Union may have acted as a moderating influence on Arafat in return for promoting PLO legitimacy, it is very probable that if PLO leaders become too moderate they will be replaced by others who are more militant. The result may be a more cautious approach toward terrorism by Soviet policymakers.

The UN is unlikely to reverse its position on terrorism any time soon, particularly after the strength shown by third world delegations during the last session of the General Assembly. A solution to the growing problem of international terrorism, like most other world problems, therefore depends largely on the willingness of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, to sincerely cooperate in stopping it. Logically, in an "era of detente," such a global approach would not be difficult to achieve, but to the Soviets "peaceful coexistence" still means only outlawing suicidal, all-out nuclear war with the United States.

Military force will probably be employed to a greater degree in responding to terrorism, but neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is likely to employ its nuclear arsenal against a nonstate terrorist organization. Each, however, provides a nuclear umbrella for a variety of nations, and such protection may encourage certain of those states to give sanctuary to terrorist groups.

Although Moscow has often condemned terrorists' "adventurism," national self-interest more frequently outweighs international goodwill, legitimacy, or ideological rhetoric when Soviet policies and goals are furthered by the act or by the propaganda value it provides. It is therefore probable that the fight against international terrorism will be pursued not through general UN or worldwide governmental agreements, but rather piecemeal, domestically, and bilaterally, through closer cooperation among the nations which hold a common view of the threat. Despite this pessimism, the United States-Cuban treaty against hijackers is a clear indication that two nations, whose world views differ radically, can work together to eliminate a common problem. Both superpowers must recognize that the techniques of terrorism can be used by anyone, regardless of ideology or nationality. There must be a recognition of its international dimensions and a general refusal to

exploit it for political gain. The United States and the Soviet Union must actively cooperate to quarantine terrorists and the nations which shelter them as a prerequisite to reversing current trends of escalating terrorism and to achieving world peace, security, and genuine detente.

For the time being, the United States should strengthen its defenses against terrorist acts. Before the Soviet Union will revise its position, Moscow must first recognize that its genuine long-range national interests are best served by strong, vocal, and meaningful opposition to terrorism, wherever it may occur. Mutual and balanced forces are insignificant when only a few determined terrorists can credibly threaten massive destruction. Unless great power antiterrorism cooperation is achieved, US and Soviet power and competition, creative or otherwise, could become meaningless in an international system whose rules, structure, and order may be vastly different from the past.

ENDNOTES

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